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Abstract
In the model two persons are considered; one person, the principal,
wants to motivate another person, the agent, to make an "appropriate
decision." The principal provides motivation in the form of an incentive
function which relates monetary rewards to a performance characteristic.
The paper begins by considering the problem in its general context where
the principal is not considering a specific class of incentive functions
or a specific class of performance characteristics. The paper then extends
this general analysis by considering linear incentives which is an extension
of a previously developed linear profit sharing model. The analysis considers
certainty and uncertainty; and risk aversion and risk preference.

A GENERAL ECONOMIC MODEL OF CONTRACTUAL INCENTIVES
In the analysis of government incentive contracts the author developed
a model [2] that showed promise of being useful as a general framework for
analyzing the basic problem of contractual incentives. To this end a
general model of incentive contracts is developed, where the model of
government incentive contracts is a special case of the general model. We
need not illustrate the general model since it has already been demonstrated
to have an application in the specific case of government incentive contracts.
However, we might mention that the model is intended to serve as a
theoretical framework for problems in the area of executive compensation,
wage bonuses, general profit sharing programs, economic motivation, incen-
tive sampling, etc. In each of these areas there is a common thread. Two
decision makers reach a mutually satisfactory agreement that forms the basis
for determining the reward one person gives to the other. This reward is a
function of some characteristic of performance. The performance character-
istic is determined subsequent to the agreement and the reward is determined
after the performance characteristic is determined.
Although the term contractual appears legalistic, its use is intended to
indicate that an agreement exists between the two decision makers and both
have the same beliefs with respect to its content and in addition both believe
that it will be honored. The agreement is not necessarily in a legal form.
Thus, the term contractual is used to identify those problems where such an
agreement is perceived to exist which is opposed to noncontractual incentives
where such an agreement is not perceived to exist.

SECTION I. INTRODUCTION TO THE GENERAL MODEL
In the general model two persons are considered, a principal and an
agent. The principal wants to motivate the agent to make an "appropriate
decision" (from the viewpoint of the principal), because the "results" for
the principal depend on both the agent's decision and the external environ-
ment.
The principal will motivate the appropriate decision by relating monetary
payments (positive or negative) to a characteristic of the agent's performance.
This relationship between the monetary reward and the characteristic of the
agent's performance is called the incentive function. Formally defined, an
incentive function is a function wherein the agent's payoff (from the principal)
is related to a performance characteristic (observed by the principal).
Linear profit sharing incentives L4j are concerned with a specific class
of incentive functions and use the principal's profit as a performance char-
acteristic. In considering this class of incentive functions the principal
is concerned with selecting (from the principal's viewpoint) an optimal in-
centive function, in terms of a sharing ratio (denoting a share of profits)
and a fixed reward, subject to the condition that the incentive function is
acceptable to the agent (the contract offered by the principal in terms of
incentive function will be accepted by the agent after he considers the other
alternatives available to him).
We might note a few of the reasons why the linear profit sharing incentive
model is of interest. First, government incentive contracts use this form;
consequently, a solution of this model is of direct use. Second, the linear
model introduces sufficient simplification to provide interesting results
without extensive abstractions. In addition, profit sharing is an acceptable
concept as attested to by the existence of government incentive contracts as
well as various profit sharing plans in industry.

In our general model only one agent is considered; however, we can
introduce other agents. If there were other agents the principal would
determine the optimal incentive function for each agent and then select
the agent that provided the best results.
The problem is normative in the following sense: given the preferences
and beliefs of both the principal and the agent, the model will determine
the incentive function, p(*)j which is optimal (from the viex^point of the
principal)
.
In addition, we are going to make the simplifying assumption that the
principal and the agent have the same beliefs with respect to the future
events. That is, they believe that the same set of events is possible
during the performance of the contract and they have the same probability
distribution over this set of events. Subsequent research can introduce
different beliefs.
Although the literature does not contain many explicit incentive models
there are a number of examples in the literature where the model presented
here would have direct application. The area of wage incentive systems
comes to mind immediately [l4, 5]. In economics Fellner [7J presents an
interesting model in terms of a labor union and management playing the roles
of principal and agent respectively (an apparent paradox). In management
theory Barnard [l] among others L 11 , 13] mentions incentives in a somewhat
qualitative fashion. In political economics Ward [16] presents a very
interesting model of a firm managed by the workers. From the area of
psychology there are models that are much more descriptive and less norma-
tive [l2]. In sampling theory there are a number of well structured models
[6, 8, 10, 17].

There are many economic environments where contractual incentives are
applicable. Government contracts as used in the weapons acquisition process
[2, 15] is one example. In the private sector of the economy there are
others. For example, consider a company which assembles components into
an end product and contracts other companies to manufacture the components
(automobiles, aircraft, boats, appliances, etc.). Another example would be
the company that requests another company to design and build the component
(architecture, construction, clothing, etc.). We might add that the model
being presented here is a generalization of a particular model involving
government incentive contracts [2]. Both of these models are referenced
to specific economic environments.
We will assume that the principal wants the agent to produce an end
result, specified in quality, quantity, place of delivery, and time of
delivery.
The contract is not fulfilled if the end result does not meet the
specifications. We will assume two things:
1. The agent is capable of producing the end result.
2. If the agent accepts the contract then he will fulfill
the contract". This assumption is almost trivial since
this is the intended role of a contract.
Description of Contract
The contract between the principal and the agent contains certain
specifications. We will focus our attention on those specifications which
motivate the agent to increase the value (determined by the principal) of
the end result.
These specifications are customarily formulated in the following way:
The contract specifies a performance characteristic, c (not necessarily
numerical). This characteristic may consider only one component such as

cost reduction, total cost, accomplishment of single objective, etc. Or
many components may be considered. In a house, for example, cost, functional
design, aesthetics, saleability, operating cost, time of availability, etc.
For the purposes of this model we will assume that the principal and
the agent agree upon the components of the performance characteristic, and
in addition agree upon the method of measuring the components of the per-
formance characteristic. For example, with cost they would have to agree
upon an accounting system, with aesthetics they may use a panel of experts,
and beyond first stage evaluation they may use arbitration, independent
appraisals, etc.
The contract must also specify the incentive function p(') that relates
the performance characteristic, c, to a monetary reward p. In other words,
p = p(c). The monetary value (to the principal) of the end result after
the performance of the contract but before the reward, p, is paid to the
contractor is denoted by g. The net monetary value after the reward is
denoted by P. Thus, P = g - p.
Let x be an index (not necessarily numerical) associated with the
agent's feasible action choices. So we have
g - g(x)
c = c(x)
because the end result and the performance characteristic are dependent upon
the agent's choice of x. And the agent's choice of x is affected by the in-
centive function p(*)-
Decision Instants
The problem focuses on three points in time. The first point, t
,
is
when the principal and the agent agree on the terms of the contract. The

second point, t , is the time when the agent makes his decision choice.
And the third point, t
,
is when the principal rev/a rds the agent in accord-
ance with the incentive function. Thus t < t , < t .
c d r
Although the model views these as specific points in time, we know that
in reality the contract is negotiated over a span of time and the agent's
action is selected over a span of time. In fact, the agent's action may be
determined prior to the end of the contract negotiations. The analysis is
simplified by considering only three points in time. Given the advantages
of simplification, any judgment about this assumption should be delayed until
we see if the results are sensitive to it.
Conceptual Restatement of the Problem
The problem of incentive contracts can be stated as one in which the
principal selects (from the principal's viewpoint) an optimal incentive
function, p(*)> subject to the condition that the contract is acceptable
to the agent (the contract offered by the principal will be accepted by
the agent after he considers the other alternatives available to him) .
The problem is normative in the following senses: given the preferences
and beliefs of both the principal and the agent, the model will determine an
incentive function, p(*)> which is optimal (from the viewpoint of the princi-
Pal).
We will assume that the principal and the agent have the same beliefs
with respect to the future events. That is, they believe that the same set
of events is possible during the performance of the contract and they have
the same probability distribution over this set of events.

Certainty and Uncertainty
We say that certainty is present when the agent can determine the
results for any feasible action choice. Otherwise uncertainty is present.
Under uncertainty he is uncertain about the results of some action choice.
Utility Functions of the Principal and Agent
To simplify matters we are going to assume with respect to the time
that the contract is specified, that the agent's environment at t^ is
certain in all respects, with the exception of the money amount R,
where R is his net profit (to be made more explicit later). Since R
may be uncertain the agent's problem is to maximize his expected utility
on the money amount R. The agent's utility function on the net revenue R
is denoted by V(R)
.
This may be adequate if the agent is indifferent with respect to the
feasible action choices, X. However, the agent may not be indifferent. If
the action choices represent different amounts of effort or time then the
agent will not be indifferent. For notational convenience we will associate
each action choice x with each utility function on the net revenue R. Then
for a given x (feasible action choice) we have V(R,x).
In the same manner we will assume, with respect to the time that the
contract is specified, that the principal's environment at tr
is certain
in all respects with the exception of P which may be uncertain. We will
also assume that the principal is indifferent with respect to the manner
in which the incentive function is specified. He is only concerned with
the net result P. So for the principal, the problem is: maximize his
expected utility subject to providing the contractor with an acceptable
contract. The utility function for the principal is defined on net profit,
P, and is denoted by u(P) , a strictly increasing function.

Notation
g Dollar amount received by the principal at a point in time.
,
The point in time is denoted by t
.
r
g = g(x)
x Decision chosen by the agent (possibly non-numerical) at a
point in time prior to t . This point in time is denoted by
t, < fc^ < t •
r
d d r
{x} Set of feasible decisions available to the agent at t,.
d
X = {x}.
The principal will influence the agent's decision by defining an
incentive function, p(*)> which relates a performance characteristic, c,
observed by the principal to a reward, p, paid by the principal to the
agent. So we have:
P = P(c)
p(') Function chosen by the principal at a point in time prior to
t.. This point in time is denoted by t
.
t < t, < t
.d c c d r
c Performance characteristic (possibly non-numerical) observed
by the principal at t
.
c = c(x)
c(') A function which relates the agent's decision to the performance
characteristic
.
P Net amount received by the principal after payment of the reward,
p, to the agent.
P = P(x) = g(x) - p(c) = g(x) - p[c(x)]
R Net dollar amount received by the agent at t .
r
R = p + q
q Dollar amount received by the agent from other activities. Ex-
cludes the reward from the principal.

q = q(x)
R(x) = pCc(x)] + q(x)
u(P) = Principal's utility function on the money amount P.
Strictly increasing in P.
V(R,x) Agent's utility function on decision x and net revenue R.
For any given x V(», •) is strictly increasing in R. The
capital letter, V, is used at this point because later we
will rewrite the utility function using the lower case, v.
L = Agent's acceptance level of expected utility.
Certainty and Uncertainty Specified
We say certainty exists at t when at t , the principal and agent knowJ c c
X, g("), c('), and V(-, •)• Otherwise there is uncertainty at t . We say
there is certainty at t when, at t they believe that at t they will know
c(-) and g(>). Otherwise there is uncertainty at t . At t d they will al-
ways know X, the feasible set of actions; and V(., .), the agent's utility
function. At t the agents utility function is unknown because he does not
c
know the environment within which he will be making the decision. For
example, he may have to work in the rain or his equipment may be ineffective
It then follows that certainty at t implies certainty at t ; and un-
certainty at t implies uncertainty at t . With this in mind we see that
there are only three cases:
I. Certainty at t ,J
c
II. Uncertainty at t and certainty at t,.
III. Uncertainty at t..
d
To summarize: At time t they have the follox^ing perception of the present
and the future.
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Case
II
III
State of knowledge
at t
Belief at t about the state
of knowledge that will exist
at t
,
Known
(Certain)
Not Known
(Uncertain)
Believe they
will know
Believe they will
not know
X, g(-),
c(-), V(-,.)
X, g(-),
1 c(-), V(-,-)
X, g(-),
c(-), V(.,-)
X, g(-)
I c(-), V(-,-)
i
1
x, g(-),
c(-), V(-,-)
X, V(-,0 g(-), c(-)
At t certain quintuples X, g(-), <=(•), q('), and V(-,-) are thought to
be possible (principal and agent have the same beliefs). For notational con-
venience we associate an index z (not necessarily numerical) with each possible
quintuple. Then for a given z (a specific quintuple) we have the functions
V(R,x;z), g(x;z), c(x;z), q(x;z) and the set X . So z is the "state of
nature" or simple "state." The state is described in terms of the set X ,
and the functions V(R,x;z), g(x;z), c(x;z) and q(x;z).
We will also define y as an index (not necessarily numerical) on the
probability distributions on z which are thought to be possible at t . The
index y will be called an information state.
{yj Set of possible information states.
Y = {y}
n(y) Probability distribution on Y.
{z} Set of possible states of nature.
Z = {z}
Tr(zly) Conditional probability distribution on Z given y.
At t,, X
,
and V(R,x;z) will be known. Consequently, we can write
d z
X and V(R,x;y).
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Essentially we have structured a single stage model. However, the
multistage model is not precluded, since V(R,x;z), g(x,z), c(x;z), q(x;z),
and u(R) are evaluated at t . So in essence we are evaluating the state
at t with respect to its present value of current and future amenities.
In this way the door is opened to include the multistage model.
Much of the subsequent development parallels the development in the
model of linear profit sharing incentives [4]. Since we are presenting
a more general model in this paper, it was deemed necessary to set the stage
properly by going through this initial development within the more general
context, although at the risk of some repetition.
Revision of Agent's Utility Function
We next define a function B(x,L;z); a money amount, given the agent's
decision x, his acceptance level L and state y; such that
1) v[B(x,L;y),x;y] = L for all x and y.
We can determine B(x,L;y) since V(R,x;y) is strictly increasing in R for
any given x and y. It should be remembered that the function B(x,L;y)
depends on the utility function V( •,•;•)• We will call B( •,•;') tne cost
function since it is the reward necessary to provide the agent with an
acceptable utility L when he makes the action choice x for state y.
Next we will introduce DLx,K;y] where
2) V{[D(x,K;y) + B(x,L;y)], x;y} = K for all x e X .
Theorem I: If, for any given K and y D(X,K;y) is a constant for all x e X
then there exists a function v(-) such that v [R-B(x, L;y)] = V[R,x;y] -
v[B(x,L;y), x;y] for all x e Xy where R = D(x,K;y) + B(x,L;y).
Proof: From (1) and (2) we see that the difference between the righthand
sides of (1) and (2) is equal to K - L for all x and y. So we can define
v(*) where
(3) v[R-B(x,L;y] = v[D(x,K;y) ,x;y.] = V[R,x;?] - V[B(x,L;y) ,x ;y] =
K-L for
all x e X y .
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Henceforth we will assume, for any given K and y, that D(x, K;y) is
a constant. Verbally this means that the utility of the net revenue, R,
can be determined from the amount that the net revenue exceeds the cost
function, B(x,L;y). Observe that v( - ) is a strictly increasing function
because V(-,-; •) is a strictly increasing in R.
Consider the case where R is a function of the decision x so we would
have R = R(x) . Moreover, this function is uncertain so we use z to index
the possible functions.
Theorem II. For any given state y
(4) Max E v[R(x;z) - B(x,L;y)] is equivalent to Max E v[R(x;z), x;y]
Proof:
(5) v{R(x;z), x;y} = v{[d(x,K(x;z) ,y) + B(x,L;y)], x;y}
= v{R(x;z) - B(x,L;y)} + v{B(x,L;y) ,x;y}
.
And since v{B(x,L;y) ,x;y] = L for all x and y then the two problems are
equivalent.
Theorem III: For any given y and R if V(R,x;y) is constant for all x e X
then B(x,L;y) is a constant for all x e X .
Proof: From Theorem I
(6) v[R-B(x,L;y)] = v[R,x;y] - v[B(x,L;y) ,x;y]
.
Since both the first and second term of the left side are constant for all
x e X then B(x,L;y) is also constant for all x s X .
y y
Theorem III means that when the agent is indifferent between the action
choices for a given state y and a given reward R then the cost function,
B(x,L;y) is a constant.
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Corollary:
For any given R if V(R,x;y) = constant for all y e Y and x e X then
B(x,L;y) is constant for all ys Y and x eX .
Proof:
This is shown in the same manner as Theorem III.
Equivalent Profit
In order to simplify the analysis and at the same time provide a more
acceptable conceptual framework we will develop some additional notation.
For an individual (principal, agent or in general any individual) we define
equivalent profit (cost), 9, as an amount of money such that
(7) W (cp) = EW(M),
where M is the dollar profit (cost) and W(-) is the utility function on M.
cp depends on W(-) and the probability distribution on the money amount M.
Equivalent profit identifies a well known concept that is called certainty
equivalent by many authors. Next we define the risk aversion increment, I,
a dollar amount, where
/'cost
,
where M is <
I profit)
As with cp, the risk aversion increment also depends on W(-) and the probability
distribution on M. The risk aversion increment also identifies a well known
concept that is called a risk premium by many authors.
We note that if M is uncertain and W(-) is twice differentiable then
we get the following results:

14
(9) If W"(°) { - \ for all values of its arguments then
0, and we say that the individual is a
II
Risk preferer"!
Risk ignorer
y
Risk averter
respectively.
We note also that if W(') is a strictly increasing (decreasing) function
on profit (cost) then maximizing (minimizing) the equivalent profit (cost) , cp,
is the same as maximizing the expected utility of profit (cost).
The concepts of equivalent profit and the risk aversion increment are
discussed more extensively elsewhere [3 J. However, they are concepts that are
not used very extensively for analysis, so it was deemed that a brief intro-
duction would be useful.
SECTION II. ANALYSIS OF THE GENERAL MODEL
In this section we would like to develop the basic framework to be used
in analyzing contractual incentives. First the basic framework is outlined by
defining the agent's problem and the principal's problem. And within that
framework we identify the major components of each problem although a detailed
analysis is delayed until the next section.
Agent's Problem
First we will consider Case III (uncertainty at t ,) since Case III con-
tains Case II (uncertainty at t ; certainty at t,) as a special case and Case
II contains Case I (certainty at t ) as a special case.
The following analysis for the most general case, Case III, may be somewhat
difficult to get through by taking it as it stands. To ease the process I
would suggest that the reader go through the material in a two or three stage
process. In other words first read it by utilizing the assumptions for Case I,
then read it by utilizing the assumptions for Case II and finally read it as
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Case III. This will move the reader from the simple to the complex. Ideally
the article should have been written in that form; however, space limitations
obviously preclude that approach.
At t the principal considers possible incentive functions, p(-)- Write
(10) p(c) = r(c) + H
This does not restrict the principal's choice of an incentive function because
he can always set H = 0. For notational convenience we will associate an index
\ (not necessarily numerical) with the possible incentive functions.
So
(11) p = p(\,H,c) = r(X,c) + H = r[X,c(x;z)] + H
= r(\,x;z) + H
p(X,H,x;z) = r(X,x;z) + H;
and
R(X,H,x;z) = p(X,H,x;z) + q(x;z)
For purposes of identification we will call r(c) the variable incentive
because its value depends on the performance characteristic. And we will call
H the fixed incentive because it is a constant.
For a specific information state y at time t let the agent's equivalent
profit, <P (X,H,x;y), be a money amount such that
a
(12) v[>
a
a,H,x;y)] = E{v[R(X,H,x; z) - B(x,L;z)] y}
.
In addition to the explicit variables the agent's equivalent profit depends on
the cost function, B(x,L;y); the probability distribution, tt(z y) ; the utility
function, v(-); and the performance characteristic function, c(x;z).
The agent has control over one variable, the decision x; and at t, he
d
has the problem of choosing an optimal decision (from the viewpoint of the
agent). At t the agent knows X, H and y. So, given X ,B(x,L;y), rr(z y) , X
and H; then the agent's problem for each information state ys Y is
(13) Max
xex
y
cp
a
(\,H,x;y)

16
The agent's optimal decision is denoted by x(X,H;y). We can write
(14) I (XH,x;y) = E[r(\,x;z)| y] + H - E[B(x, : ly) ] + E[q(x;z)ly]
a '
- cp [X,H,x;yl.
q
Taking the partial derivative of (14) with respect to H we get
(15) 61 a,H,x;y) = 1 - 6cp (\ jH ,x;y)
3 «
611
Thus, if 6cp (\,H,x;y) = 1,
3
6H
then
(16) 6i
a
(X,H,x;y)
6H
for all x and H. Consequently, the agent's decision would be independent of H,
Therefore, x(X,H;y) could be written x(X;y).
As an example, let
(17) v(k) = 1 - [1/7]] [exp (-Tlk)], n > ,
an exponential utility function, then
(18) 6cp (\,H,x;y) = 1.
3
6H
Consequently, the exponential utility function is a sufficient condition for
(16). We also observe that the risk aversion increment would be constant for
all values of H.
We denote cp (X,H) as the contractor's equivalent profit at t where
3 C
(19) v[cp (\,H)] = Ev{cp [X,H J x(X 5H;y);y]}3 3
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The agent's equivalent profit, cp (\,H), depends on X, H, v(.) and the prob-
3
ability distributions Tr(zjy) and rr(y) . cp (X,H) is related to the interval
-. 3
t and t, whereas cp (X,H.x;y) is related to the interval t
, to t .
c d a d r
Theorem IV:
(20) v[cp (\,H)] = E{E{v{R[\,H,x(A,H;y); Z ] - B[x(X,H;y) ,L;y]] | y}}3
Proof:
Follows directly from (12) and (19).
Principal's Problem
If we let p = B(x,L;y) then the agent's utility would be v(0) for all
x and y. The agent would accept a contract with that incentive function. In
other words
,
(21) v[B(x,L;y), x;y] = L.
Theorem V:
The agent will accept a contract if and only if cp (A.,H) > 0.
3
Proof:
From Theorem I we get v(0) = and from (19) and Theorem I we get
(22) v[<P (\,H)] = Ev[cp[\,H,xa,H;y);y]}
3 3
= E{E{v{R[\,H,x(X,H;y);z], x(X,H,y); 2 ]} y }} - L>
as a necessary and sufficient condition for the agent to accept the contract.
The proof is completed by observing that v(-) is a strictly increasing function,
With Theorem V in mind we see that at t the principal must provide a
contract which is acceptable to the agent. Consequently, the principal must
choose X and H such that
(23) cp a,H ) > 0.
3
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Let <P (^,H) denote the principal's equivalent profit at t , where
(24) u[cp a,H)] = E{E {u[p(X,H;y,z] y}}
and
P(X
5 H;y, 2 ) = g[x(\,H;y);z] - p[X,H,x(X,H;y) ;z].
The principals equivalent profit depends on the incentive function, p( - );
the probability distributions TT(zjy) and n(y) ; and the agent's optimal decision,
x(X,H;y).
At t the principal would like to choose X and H so as to maximize his
c
equivalent profit, subject to providing the agent with an acceptable contract.
So the principal's problem is
(25) Max, cp (X,U) subject to cp (X,H) >
A,H P a
Given (18) then the agent's decision is independent of the value of H.
Thus the agent's equivalent profit is monotonic increasing on H and the
principal's equivalent profit is monotonic decreasing on H. Consequently, any
solution providing an equivalent profit to the agent which is greater than
will provide the principal with an equivalent profit which is less than that
provided by the optimal solution. Therefore, the optimal solution to the
principal's problem is a Pareto-optimal solution.
Although (18) is a sufficient condition for equality it is not necessary.
Conceptually we are assuming that the agent's decision is not influenced by
the value of H, in a local sense. In other words, within the range of feasible
values for H the agent's decision will be independent of the value of H.
Henceforth, we will assume an equality restriction. So given the equality
restriction we can determine H(X) such that
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(26) cp [X,H(X)] =
a
Since the ageiit's decision is independent of H x^e will denote x(X;y) as
the agent's optimal decision. Next we let
(27) 9 (X;y) = cp fX,H(X), x(X;y);y}
3 3
(28) 9 (X) h cp [X,H(X)],
a a
9 (X) = cp [X,H(X)].
r r
Next, we write
(29) I
a
(X) = E{9
a
(X;y)} - 9
g
(X)}
I (X;y) = I {X,H(X),x(X;y);y}
a a
In the same manner as with equivalent profit we see that 1 (X) is related to
a
the interval t and t, whereas I (X;y) is related to the interval t , to t
.
c d a d r
We observe that the principal's problem can now be written
(30) Max (X).
Next we denote the principal's risk aversion increment, I (X), where
(31) I
p
(X) = E {E {p[X,H(X);y,z] |y}} - 9 (X)
The risk aversion increment depends on the same functions and variables
as 9 (X).
P
Since the agent's restriction is an equality restriction then 9 (X) =
9
for all X. Using this in addition to (29) and (31) we can then rewrite (30).
(32) Max^ [g^ - B^ + q^ - yX) - I g (X) - E[l a (X;y)]}
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where
g
X
E{E {q[x(X;y); 2 ]|y}}
E{E [g[x(X;y); Z ]|y }}
B
\ h E (B[x(X;y), L;y]}
The result in (32) is somewhat surprising because the principal is selecting
X so as to maximize the principal's profit, plus the agent's profit, less both
the principal's and agent's risk aversion increments as well as B, . At this point
A.
we will pause for a slight digression although we will return to (32) later
and analyze the various components in a linear incentive model.
To digress,
Since 9 (X) = for all X then we get
(33) 9 (X) = p + q - BX - E I (X;y) - I (X) =
a a. A. a a
where
(34) p^ = E [E {p {X,H(X) ; x(X;y); Z }/y}}
Let a and (3 denote two different X indices so we can write
(35) 9 (a) - 9 (P) = p - p - B + B Q + q - q ca a a p a p Ha 4 P
- E I (a;y) + E I (P;y)
a a
- i (a) + I (3)
a a
= 0.
We now rewrite (35) to get
(36) P(y - Pp = B^ - B
p
+ q
p
- qa
+ E I^cjy) - E I^pjy)
+ I
a
(o) - I
a
(p).

21
So the increase (decrease) in the agent's reward is the increase in the agent's
risk aversion increments; plus the increase in the expected value of the cost
function, B,
;
plus the decrease in expected profit from other activities.
Using (33) we can rewrite (32), the principal's problem,
(37) Max^ [g
x
- P
x
- I (*)].
Therefore, if we assume that the principal has a linear utility function,
I (X) = for all X, we then get the principal's problem as
(38) Max^ {g
x
- p^ }
Verbally, the principal chooses the incentive function such that there is no
other incentive function for which the increase (decrease) in the expected
gross profit is more (less) than the increase (decrease) in the expected
reward.
Extension of Results to Case II and Case III.
Case II (certainty at t
,
uncertainty at t ) is a special case of Case III,
d c
The agent's risk aversion increment, I (X;y), is equal to zero since there is
certainty at t . Consequently (16) is satisfied. So in the principal's
problem the restriction can be stated in the form of an equality without any
assumptions and the solution is pareto-optimal
.
Case I (certainty at t ) is a special case of Case II which also makes it
a special case of Case III. In addition to I (X;y) being equal to zero we will
3
also have I (X) and I (\) equal to zero,
a P
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SECTION III. ANALYSIS OF THE LINEAR INCENTIVE MODEL
In this section we will extend the general model by considering a specific
class of incentive functions. This class of functions is called linear incen-
tives. This class is more general than linear profit sharing incentives.
Linear Incentive Functions
The Theory of linear profit sharing incentives [4] is a special case of
the linear incentive model. As mentioned before the profit sharing model
utilizes the principals profit as a performance characteristic. In the linear
incentive model we consider other classes of performance characteristics that
would be amenable to analysis under a linear incentive model.
With this in mind let us consider
(39) p(c) = Yc + 3
as the linear incentive function where Y and P characterize the incentive
function. We will call y the sharing coefficient and (3 the fixed reward.
In the linear profit sharing model, c is the principal's profit, y is the
agent's share of the profit and P is a fixed dollar amount.
To support the choice of linear incentives we can cite one feature that
is generally found in most performance characteristics. Generally, a perfor-
mance characteristic has a strict monotonic relation increasing or decreasing
with the principal's profit. With this in mind we hope to extend the results
of the linear profit sharing model to a more general model of incentives on
monotonic performance characteristics. First, we will consider the strictly
increasing relation. The results for strictly increasing relationships can
be easily extended to the case of strictly decreasing relationships.
Formally, the strictly increasing relationship is stated as follows:
For all z e Z
y
g(x ;z) - g(x ;z) for and ex
(40) > J 1 2 y
c(x
n
;z) - c(x
2
;z) and x^^ =7^ *
2
'
Where g(x;z) is the principal's revenue and c(x;z) is the performance characteristic,
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The. increasing relationship would have the inequality in the other direction.
In the following analysis we will discuss some of the major factors that
affect the selection of an optimal incentive function(from the principal's
viewpoint). The analysis will assume that the principal's profit and the
agent's other profit are independent. In other words, the correlation
coefficient is zero. The problem of correlation is discussed by Berhold [4]
in some detail. Any further discussion at this point does not appear to be
worthwhile. You might also note that the foregoing assumption also means that
the performance characteristic and the agent's other profit will also be in-
dependent. In addition, due to their monotonic relationship, the performance
characteristic and the principal's profit will be positively correlated.
Analysis of the Components of the Principal's Problem
We now return to the principal's problem as we left it in (32). And
as promised we will now analyze the various components of that problem.
Henceforth the case of risk preference will not be considered. Risk
preference, in an economic environment, is believed to be an exception rather
than the rule. Exclusion of risk preference does not exclude decision makers
that will choose decisions involving risk; it merely excludes the decision
maker who behaves as if the uncertain payoff is preferred to the certain
payoff even if both have the same expected monetary value.
In the following analysis we will assume that the agent is a strict risk
averter. By a strict risk averter we mean that his utility function v(-) is
strictly concave. In other words, for any two money amounts M and N (l-e)vQ-l)
+ ev(N) < v[(l-e)M + eN] where < e < 1. We are restricting ourselves
to strict risk aversion because linear utility produces trivial results.
In addition this paper never intended to consider utility functions with
both concave and convex portions.
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In the following analysis we are assuming that the agent has a set of
discrete decisions to consider at each state y. This is a more general
problem than the case where the possible decisions are represented by a
continuous variable.
We begin by considering the principal's problem as stated in (32), which,
according to (37) , can be restated in the following form:
(41) Max
y
{gy
- Yc
y
- P(Y) - I (Y) }
Consider the first portion:
(42) g
y
- Yc
y
- P(Y)
For the case where the agent's decisions are unaffected by a change in Y for
each state y we can take the derivative with respect to Y to get
(43) -c - J*™-v
Y dy
The following analysis will deal with (43).
Since the agent's expected utility is constant for all values of y then
we get
h i ,
dA(y;y;z)
(44)
-^ E{E[v[A( Y ;y;z)]} I yl = E{E{v'[A(Y;y;z)] 5
- }|y } } =
and
(45) figozai. ^Kvl + .[,(,,„..]
where
d 3(Y) is a constant for all z.
Y
On rewriting (44) and adding c to both sides we get
(46) d P^> + c - c E{E{{v'[A(Y;y;z)]c[x(Y;y);z]}|y }}
d
Y
Y Y E[E{v'CA(Y;y;z)]|y }}
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If v'[A(Y;y;z)] is non-negative with upper and lower bounds then we see
that the ratio in right-hand side of (46) meets the requirements of a prob-
ability distribution. Moreover, v"[A(Y;y;z)] < (excludes risk preference)
so the probability distribution is decreasing. An exponential utility function
is an example.
Now if c[x(Y;y);z] is positively correlated with A[y;y;z] it then follows
that the lower values of c[x(Y;y);z] have a higher weighting than the higher
values. This is opposed to the weighting given when v'[A(Y;y;z)] is excluded.
Thus the right-hand side of (46) is greater than zero. Consequently,
d P(Y)(47)
dY
+ c > 0,
Y -
for ranges of Y such that the agent's decision is constant for each state y.
We have assumed that there is zero correlation between the performance
characteristic and the agent's other profit. Thus c[x(y;y);z] is positively
correlated with ALY;y;z] for y> and negatively correlated for Y <0. Conse-
V) (>quently
,
d P(Y)(48)
d Y
+ c < = / when Y - 0.
<
One other point we might mention. As y increases for y > then the
correlation between c[x(Y;y) ;z] and ALY;y;zJ also increases. Consequently
the left-hand side of (47) increases with Y- Thus, (43) is a negative and
becoming more negative as y increases for y > 0. By the same token (43) is
positive and becoming less positive as Y increases for Y < 0.
Next consider the case when the agent alters his decision. First, what
happens to P(Y) when the agent alters his decision. We know that for a given
decision the agent's equivalent profit 9 {x;Y)P;y} is a continuous function
in Y> Consequently, for each state y, cp (x(Y;y) ; Y! Pjy] is a continuous function.3
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In other words for the value of Y at which one decision replaces the other
we have
(49) cp {h;Y;P;y} = cp [k;Y;P;y]
3 3
where h = x(v-£;y) and k = x(Y+ e;y) , e>0 . Since the equivalent profit is
J constant, a change in the decision does not require a change in P in order
for cp ( Y ) = L.
a
Thus, when the agent's decision changes we have $(y) unchanged, so the
incremental change in (42) is given by
(50) E{E{g(k ;z ) - g(h;z) - Y[c(k;z) - c(h;z)]}Jy}
where the agent changes his decision for only a single state y. Consequently,
(42) is a decreasing function with jumps (positive or negative) occurring when
the agent alters a decision.
The next question; are these jumps positive or negative. We know, from
(49), that for any state y
(51) q(h) + Yc(h) - I (Y,h) = q(k) + Yc(k) - I (Y,k),9 3
where
I (<*,x;y) = I [x;a,P(aO;y].
a 3
The y has been dropped for brevity. In addition
(52) q(h) + (Y-e)c(h) - lE(Y-e),h] > q(k) + (y-e)c(k) - I [(Y-e) ,k] , e>0.
a a
Subtracting (51) from (52)
(53) e[c(k) - c(h)] > [I (Y,k) - I ( Y ,h)3 - [i C(Y-e)k] - I [(Y-0,h]}.3 3 3 3
Now if we assume that
(54) I
a
(v,k) - i
a
[(Y-e)k] > I
a
(Y,h) - I
a
C(Y-e),h]
then it follows that the jumps are not negative.
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What does (54) mean. Consider the left hand side of (54). This is a
measure of the increase in the risk aversion increment for the same decision.
Since the decision is constant, the only variable is the sharing coefficient.
So, if there is a zero correlation between the performance characteristic, c, and
the agent's other profit, q; and in addition a (k) > a (h) , where a denotes the
respective standard deviations then (54) follows. In other words, if k is the
riskier decision with respect to the agent's reward then an increase in the
sharing coefficient induces the agent to increase the performance characteristic
in addition to increasing his own risk. And since the principal's profit has
a strictly increasing relation with the performance characteristic then the
agent increases the principal's profit at the same time.
On the other hand, if an increase in the sharing coefficient induces the
agent to reduce his risk [(54) does not hold] then he may reduce the performance
characteristic which in turn reduces the principal's profit. Consequently, the
jump may be negative.
In general, we expect
(55) I (Y,h) - I (Y;k) =
3. a
because most decisions would involve a transfer of resources from the agent's
other contracts to the principal's contract without materially affecting risk.
So when y is increased the agent is motivated to shift resources since the
incremental payoff for shifting resources to the principal's contract is
increasing directly with Y. Consequently, we expect c(y) and consequently
g(y) to be increasing functions. In the continuous case this would follow
directly from the assumption of decreasing rates of return.
Thus, we use (55) to get the right-hand side of (53) equal to zero giving
(56) e[c(k) - c(h)] > 0.
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Consequently the jumps are positive. In other words, the performance char-
acteristic and in turn the principal's profit is increasing in Y if risk is,
in general, a constant at the time the agent makes his decision. This is
not to say that there is no risk; we are merely saying that whatever the risk,
it is unchanged from one decision to the other.
For any given y assume, for the moment, that
g(x :z) - g(x ;z)
(57) ^-i—
^
T-^—s = Ic(x
1
;2) - c(x
2
;z)
for any x, and x„ e Xy and x
1
=f= x„ where § is a constant and E > from
(40). If the principal's profit were being used as the performance character-
istic (linear profit sharing incentives) then 5=1. Verbally (57) assumes
a linear relationship between the performance characteristic and the principal's
payoff. Before justifying this assumption let us see what results it provides.
Using (57) it is easy to show that
(58) I (Y) > I ( I ) = 0. for all Y-
da
• cr
If a =f= and — = then I (y) is strictly decreasing in y when y < 5 and
strictly increasing in Y when Y > §.
Next we will show that < Y* ^ § 5 where Y* is the optimal sharing coef-
ficient. To do this we will use (32), a different formulation of the principal's
problem. We note that for each state y
(59) 5c(5;y) + q(?;y) - I (l;y) > §c(X;y) + q(X;y) - I (\;y)
a 3
for all \. This follows from the agent's problem.
Next consider I (Y) in (34). If v(<) is strictly concave then
(60) v{ E [ cp ( Y ;y)} } - v{ E { cp
(
Y;y) } - I (Y) }
a 33
= E { cp (Y;y)} - Ev { 9 ( Y ;y)} ^ for all y.3 3

And from (60) we get
(61) I (y) > 0, for all Y.
3
da do
Furthermore, if a =f= 0, c =f= and —— = , q = with respect
g q dY dy
to the interval t to t,, then
c d
1. I (Y) > 0, for all Y.
a
2. I (y) is strictly decreasing in Y when y < 0.
3
3. I (y) is strictly increasing in Y when Y > 0.
a
Using these results in addition to (58) and (59) it then follows that
£ Y* < I.
Consider the case where the agent's decisions are constant for all states
y, regardless of the value of Y« Then from (48) and (58) we would get 0<y,v<5-
Thus, for this case, even if the agent is not motivated to alter his decisions
the principal will use the sharing coefficient as a basis for reducing his risk.
If, in addition the principal is a risk ignorer, then we have Y* = 0. Conse-
quently, when the principal is a risk ignorer then y* > only if it induces
the agent to alter his decisions and thereby increase the performance character-
istic which in turn increases the principal's profit.
Next, consider the case where the agent is a risk ignorer, I (Y;y) = I (Y) = 0.
a a
Using (28) along with (58) and (59) we get y* = §• Thus, y* = ? when the agent
is a risk ignorer and the principal is a risk averter.
So we see that (57) provides rather extensive results. However, further
analysis of the results would be required to determine their sensitivity to
any relaxation in the assumption.
To provide some support for our assumption we can cite an additional ex-
ample (in addition to profit sharing) where (57) holds. There are many examples
where the probability distribution on z is independent of the agent's decision.
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Given this then the linear assumption in (57) is easier to support. This can
be seen by considering such performance characteristics as hours worked, pro-
portion defectives in a production lot, items produced, cost reduction, items
sold, etc. Consequently (57) becomes more palatable.
In our previous analysis we have excluded 8 however we must still determine
its optimal value. We can determine P* by using (26) to get B* = B(v*) , where
B(y) plays the same role as H(X)
.
We might again stress the value of using equivalent profit and the risk
aversion increment. Without these concepts the preceding results would have
been extremely difficult if not impossible to obtain. Although we could have
obtained similar results using methods of calculus (first and second derivatives),
the results would be restricted to cases where that procedure would be relevant.
However, we know that the profit functions are unlikely to be continuous on
the index x.
It is straightforward to extend the foregoing results to the case of a
strictly decreasing relationship between the performance characteristic and the
principals profit. The decreasing relationship occurs when the inequality in
(40) is in the other direction.
Extension of the Results to Case I and Case II.
Case II (certainty at t
,
uncertainty at t ) is a special case of Case III.
The agent's risk aversion increment, I (Y;y), is equal to zero since there is
certainty at t . Consequently (12) is satisfied. So in the principal's
problem the restriction can be stated in the form of an equality without any
assumptions and the solution is pareto-optimal . In addition (55) would be
satisfied, consequently from (53) we get g(k) > g(h) so the agent will not
reduce the principal's profit. For the continuous case with decreasing returns
we would get g[x(Y;y) ,y] as strictly increasing in y for each state y.
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Case I (certainty at t ) is a special case of Case II which also makes it
a special case of Case III. In addition to I (Y;y) being equal to zero we will
3
also have I (Y) and I (y) equal to zero. If we also assume (57) then Y* = § 9
a p
because from (32) the principal's problem is
(62) Max
y
[g
Y
+ qy
}
and if y = 5 an equivalent problem for the agent is
(63) Max
x£X [§c(x) + q(x)L
Consequently when the agent chooses an optimal decision (from the agent's
viewpoint) he chooses a decision that is also optimal from the viewpoint of
the principal. So for Case I the agent makes the same decision with y = § as
the principal would if he chose to dictate or control the agent's decision.
SECTION IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
One of the major contributions of this paper is the development of a basic
structure for the analysis of contractual incentives. The structure of the
model in this paper is sufficiently complex to allow additional insights that
are unexpected. In addition, this model also provides the basis for extending
the analysis. For example, the agent and principal may not have the same
probability distributions over the possible events. The model in this paper
assumes that the principal and the agent are in agreement with respect to the
probability distribution. Even in this model, as it stands, there are many
aspects that require more analysis; however, space limitations precluded any
extensions
.
Another contribution of the model is the confirmation of some intuitive
concepts. For example, we indicated that < Y* - I under certain conditions.
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In addition, we showed that in general the agent will increase the principal's
profit when Y is increased. One counter-intuitive result is the principal's
choice of the sharing coefficient so as to maximize his profit plus the agent's
profit less the risk of both the principal and the agent.
The model is extremely important in terms of potential application. The
underlying characteristics of this incentive mode] are evident in many areas.
Some of these are conceptual, such as psychology and management, and others are
analytical, such as the theory of wages and unemployment. It is not surprising
that the incentive model can be identified in so many diverse areas. Actually
we should expect to find the incentive model in any field concerned with human
interaction. If a person wants to influence the decision of another person then
he attempts to set up a system of rewards (positive or negative) in order to
influence that decision.
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